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For most of the last three decades, economic growth in the Philippines lagged its Asian 
neighbors, earning it such sobriquets as "the Sick Man of Asia" and "the Latin American 
of Asia." During the Asian financial crisis however, the sick man proved more resilient 
than his neighbors. This was not simply a matter of being unable to fall out of the 
basement. On the eve of the crisis in mid-1997, the Philippines economy was 
forecasted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and private sector analysts to grow 
at more than six percent in 1998—a rate faster than most other low income countries 
worldwide, and a rate faster than the Philippines' own performance in recent history. 
When the crisis hit in the second half of 1997, those same forecasts exhibited less 
downward revision for the Philippines than for the other Asian countries, and in fact, the 
Philippines' contraction was considerably less severe than the others. 
The question naturally arises as to why the Philippines, with its reputation for weakness, 
fared better in the crisis than other countries in the region. To answer that question one 
has to have a theory or explanation of the crisis, and then show how the Philippines 
differed from its comparators in the relevant dimensions. This paper examines two non-
mutually exclusive explanations for the crisis, weak domestic fundamentals and 
international contagion, and concludes that the Philippines endured the crisis relatively 
more successfully than its neighbors both because its financial system was in better 
shape than others around the region, and because it had a uniquely low vulnerability to 
contagion. In particular, the Philippines had already had its financial crises, and as a 
consequence, had undertaken measures to strengthen its domestic financial system. 
This observation is at once both trite and profound: it suggests that backsliding on the 
part of the Philippines could lead to renewed problems, and, that with respect to the 
benefits of financial market reform, the other countries around the world might have 
something to learn from the sick man. 
 
The Fundamentalist Creed 
There are two principal economic theories or explanations for the Asian financial crisis: 
one which emphasizes the weakness of economic fundamentals, especially in the 
financial sector, and the other that emphasizes panic or international contagion on the 
part of financial market investors.1 The relevant "fundamentals" relate both to internal 
and external factors such as international trade competitiveness.2Working from large 
global data bases on the financial crises, empirical research by Tornell (1999) and 
Goldstein et al. (2000) identify a fairly robust set of predictors of banking or currency 
crises which include rapid real exchange rate appreciation over trend; decline in equity 
prices; decline in export revenues; a high ratio of the domestic money stock to foreign 
exchange reserves, lending booms, decline in output, and a large current account deficit 
relative to national income or investment. 
How did the Philippines stack up in 1997? Not too well on these measures. The 
Philippines began experiencing a nominal exchange rate appreciation in 1992 after the 
foreign exchange market was liberalized, and eventually the central bank would 
undertake a variety of measures including relaxation of capital outflow restrictions, 
repaying some foreign debts at an accelerated rate, and sterilized interventions in the 
currency market in an attempt to limit the appreciation.3 These actions in turn 
encouraged the growth of the domestic money supply relative to foreign exchange 
reserves—another indicator of incipient financial crisis. The associated real exchange 
rate appreciation contributed to a modest slowdown in Philippine export revenues, 
though it is hard to disentangle how much of this was due to reduced export volumes 
and how much was due to falling prices.4 The Philippines did experience some mild 
adverse terms of trade shocks in the period before the crisis in the form of reduced 
prices for electronics exports and a variety of commodity exports. The current account 
deficit widened from less than two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992, to 
between four and five percent of GDP thereafter, despite a significant growth in 
revenues from remittances. The merchandise trade deficit exhibited an even more 
dramatic increase than the broader current account measure. 
With regard to its internal fundamentals, the Philippines experienced an enormous 
lending boom in the 1990s. Bank lending to the private sector as a share of GDP more 
than doubled between 1990 and 1997. The stock market peaked in January 1997 and 
proceeded to fall by nearly 25 percent over the next six months. By most of the robust 
predictors of financial crisis, the Philippines was an accident waiting to happen. Indeed, 
Goldstein et al. (2000) report an experiment in which they use an econometric model to 
predict the out of sample vulnerability of 19 countries to financial crises. On the basis of 
the indicators for the period January 1996 to January 1997, the five countries most likely 
to experience a crisis were South Africa, the Czech Republic, Thailand, South Korea, 
and the Philippines. All except South Africa subsequently did experience crises. For the 
more inclusive period of January 1996 to December 1997, their model identifies the 
countries most likely to experience a crisis as being the Czech Republic, South Korea, 
Thailand, South Africa, and Colombia. Again, South Africa was the only one which did 
not experience a crisis. The surprise is not that the Asian countries, including the 
Philippines, experienced crises—it was that South Africa did not. The bottomline is that 
the Philippines crisis could have been predicted on the basis of weak fundamentals. 
Crisis Performance 
Yet as can be seen in table 1, the deviation between the Philippines forecast growth 
rate in 1998 and its actual performance was by far the smallest of the Asian countries. 
This was not simply a matter of luck: the forecast revisions were also the smallest, 
indicating that the forecasters believed that the Philippines was likely to be the least 
affected of the Asian countries. There are essentially two explanations: first, that the 
Philippines financial sector was stronger than others around the region, and second, 
that the Philippines was uniquely insulated from regional contagion. 
Historically, the Philippines had a relatively repressed and inefficient financial system. 
Williamson and Mahar (1998) survey the financial systems of 34 countries, rating them 
on six dimensions: credit controls, interest rates, entry barriers, bank autonomy, 
privatization, and international capital flows. In each case the Philippines banking sector 
of the 1970s received a grade of "repressed" or "partly repressed." Hutchcroft (1998) 
describes the Philippine banking sector as characterized by "rampant favoritism" and 
"inefficient state regulation." (This is, afterall, the country that gave us the term "crony 
capitalism." 
As a consequence, the Philippine financial sector did a poor job of mobilizing saving 
and allocating capital, and was prone to instability, experiencing crises in the mid-
1970s, early 1980s, and mid-1980s.5(Sadly, by experiencing crises under conditions of 
both capital account openness and closure, the Philippines proved that "hot money" 
international capital flows may be a sufficient, though are not a necessary, condition for 
financial meltdown.) The formal banking sector was essentially an urban 
phenomenon—in the rural areas wealth was predominately held in non-monetary forms. 
Barriers to entry and regulatory forbearance contributed to cartelization of the banking 
sector and the consequent super-normal profits to those lucky enough to obtain a 
banking license. 
The Philippine government undertook a number of significant reforms of the real side of 
the economy in the 1980s, equalizing incentives across different activities, a process 
that continued into the 1990s. There had been a number of attempts to change the 
financial system, but it was not until the 1990s, that significant reform was achieved. 
Initially, entry barriers were modestly relaxed, with the number of branches increasing 
from 1,957 at the end of 1990, to 3,175 at the end of 1995 (Fritz-Krockrow, 1999). This 
was followed by a period of reform during 1993-5 in which the central bank was 
rehabilitated, commercial banks were forced to increase their capitalization ratios, new 
foreign and domestic entrants were allowed to enter the market, and the quality of 
prudential regulation was strengthened. The result was an increase in competition that 
eroded some oligopoly profits, promoted the mobilization of saving, and encouraged 
financial deepening. So, for example, the ratio of money and quasi-money to national 
income, which had been rising steadily since 1986 accelerated its increase, more than 
doubling from 23 percent to 49 percent between 1986 and 1996. 
Not only was the amount of finance increasing, so was its quality. As noted earlier, 
reforms begun in the 1980s had significantly equalized incentives across activities. The 
financial sector reforms which opened the banking system to new domestic and foreign 
entrants contributed to a managerial and technological upgrading of the system, in part 
driven by a reverse brain drain of returning Filipino bankers who had been employed 
outside the Philippines by foreign banks. Together, these reforms combined generate a 
more efficient pattern of investment. 
Table 2 reports changes in the incremental capital-output ratio, an admittedly crude 
indicator of the efficiency of investment. As countries develop, capital deepening occurs, 
and one would expect the incremental capital output ratio to rise (i.e. as more capital-
intensive techniques of production are adopted, the amount of investment needed to 
produce a unit of output increases). Instead, the data for the Philippines shows a fall in 
the incremental capital-output ratio. That is to say, the Philippines was getting 
significantly more "bang for the buck" in the mid-1990s than it had a decade earlier. 
Indeed, on a variety of financial market indicators, on the eve of the crisis, the Philippine 
financial system looked more solid than did others in Asia (tables 3 and 4). Although the 
Philippines experienced a domestic credit boom in the mid-1990s, it went on for a 
shorter duration than those else where in Asia. So, for example, the Philippine banking 
sector appears to have been less "over-lent" than others in Asia on the eve of the crisis 
in aggregate terms. Moreover, the quality of bank lending appears to have been higher 
as well: exposure to the real estate sector was lower, collateral valuations were lower, 
and capital adequacy was higher. Non-performing loans were lower going into the crisis, 
and increased less once the crisis was underway. This is not to say that the Philippine 
financial sector was perfect: as Williamson and Mahar (1998) observe, despite the 
abolition of directed credit, commercial banks remained dependent on the central bank's 
discount window providing a mechanism for the government to influence lending, and 
cartel price-fixing practices had not been eradicated, despite new entries into the 
market. Nor have subsequent events demonstrated that the financial system is free of 
taint. Rather, this is only to say that the Philippine system looked good relative to those 
elsewhere in Asia. 
The lower real estate exposure, in particular, turned out to be important.6 As Hutchcroft 
(1999) points out, because of higher interest rates prevailing in the Philippines, property 
developers were forced to adopt more conservative approaches to financing, and were 
less over-leveraged than their Thai counterparts. This was reinforced in June 1997 
when the central bank imposed ceilings on banks' loan exposure to the real estate 
sector and the permissible collateral valuation of real estate security.7 As a 
consequence, the Philippines (and South Korea) were distinct in that to a significant 
extent the domestic lending boom financed overcapacity in internationally traded-goods 
sectors, rather than non-tradables such as real estate. Moreover, the Philippine 
corporate sector was less over-leveraged than elsewhere in Asia (table 5). 
This difference in the sectoral pattern of lending had implications for how the economy 
was able to respond to the crisis. When the exchange rate collapsed the country 
experienced a significant real exchange rate depreciation, as did other countries in 
Southeast Asia. However, to greater extent that the others, the lending boom in the 
Philippines had financed investment in internationally tradable sectors. Because of 
excess capacity in the tradables sector and less impairment of corporate balance 
sheets meant the Philippines was better able to exploit the real exchange rate 
depreciation, increasing exports (as well as substituting domestically produced goods 
for imports). As a consequence, the Philippines was able to generate the big reduction 
in its current account deficit through exporting (and thereby maintaining the level of 
domestic output), rather than through a compression of imports.8 
Yet fundamentals are only half of the story. What about contagion? There are 
essentially two channels. One is through international trade. If one country devalues 
then other countries which compete against it in world markets have been relatively 
disadvantaged (i.e. they have experienced a real exchange rate appreciation). It is not 
necessary that the countries compete against each other in each others' markets—in 
fact, the competition is likely to occur in third country markets. So, for example, when 
Thailand devalued the baht, Philippine exporters were disadvantaged in the US and 
Japanese markets. Thus a devaluation by one country can lead to pressure for 
competitive devaluations by other, similarly situated, countries. 
The second channel is through the financial markets. There is a growing academic 
literature that seeks to provide theoretical explanations of herd-like behavior on the part 
of investors.9 The empirical evidence on the determinants of contagion is conflicting: 
Glick and Rose (1998) find that trade links do a better job than herding in explaining 
contagion, while Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) and Kim and Wei (1999) provide evidence 
to suggest that prior to the crisis, foreign investors tended to be herding, positive feed-
back traders. 
With respect to the trade channel, Noland et al. (1999) show that the devaluations 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia had only a modest impact on the Philippines balance of 
payments position. Moreover, the Philippines appeared to have been less vulnerable to 
financial market contagion than its neighbors for reasons of both policy and luck. 
Because of the Philippines experience during the debt crisis of the 1980s, its policy 
makers appeared to be particularly risk-averse, especially with regard to short-term 
fixed interest rate bank debt.10 At the onset of the crisis, Philippine debt indicators were 
better than its neighbors (table 5). In particular, compared to its neighbors, the 
Philippines had relatively less exposure to Japanese bank lending. This was due both to 
low levels of Japanese foreign direct investment in the Philippines relative to other 
Southeast Asian countries (Japanese banks tended to follow their domestic clients into 
foreign countries) and policies which had encouraged non-Japanese banks into the 
Philippine market. The presence of non-Japanese banks and their competitive 
advantages over Japanese banks tended to crowd-out Japanese lending to non-
Japanese borrowers. This would become important in the fall of 1997, when the 
weakness of Japanese banks caused them to begin refusing to roll-over loans, and 
even calling in existing loans.11 
At the same time, due to the country's historically weak economic performance relative 
to its neighbors, despite its relatively developed and open capital markets, it was 
underweighted in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Far East Ex-Japan 
Free Index, the benchmark against which the performance of mutual funds investing in 
emerging market Asia are usually compared.12 Mutual fund managers tend to stick fairly 
closely to the index in their country allocations, so as a consequence, the Philippines 
had relatively less exposure to foreign mutual fund managers. Again, this meant that the 
Philippines had relatively less exposure to international "hot money" flows than did 
others in the region. 
Goldstein et al. (2000) use an econometric model to attempt to integrate quantitatively 
the two basic contributing factors to the occurrence of a financial crisis: weak 
fundamentals and contagion. They find that while the dominant cause of the financial 
crisis in Indonesia was contagion, it played virtually no role in the Philippines (table 6). 
The Philippine crisis was almost entirely home grown. 
 
Conclusions 
The Philippines has long been regarded as the weak sister of Asia, but in the Asian 
financial crisis it performed relatively well. This is not simply a matter of not being able 
to fall out of the basement, either—in mid-1997 the Philippines economy was forecasted 
to grow at more than six percent in 1998, and both the post-crisis forecasts revisions, 
and the degree of the eventual contraction were less in the Philippines than elsewhere 
in Asia. Rather, the Philippines crisis experience offers valuable lessons for the 
Philippines, the rest of Asia, and indeed, emerging markets around the world. The 
lesson is that policies matter: economic reform, particularly of the financial system, can 
have a demonstrable impact on a country's ability to weather a crisis, even if the crisis 
originates elsewhere and is spread by contagion. 
This is not to say that the Philippines is a model of economic rectitude. It is not, and the 
evidence presented in this paper suggests that despite a decade of reforms, the crisis 
that hit the Philippines in July 1997 was largely home grown. (Indeed, the home grown 
crisis might have been worse had not external events short-circuited the domestic 
lending boom which was underway.) Worse yet, since the crisis the country has failed to 
capitalize on its relatively strong performance. It has experienced several financial 
scandals and key pieces of economic reform legislation have languished in the 
Congress for months. 
Nevertheless, the sick man merely caught a cold—he did not catch pneumonia. Had the 
Philippines not undertaken its financial sector reforms, the crisis undoubtedly would 
have been worse. Moreover, backsliding could precipitate a crisis in the future. These 
are lessons that policy makers both inside and outside the Philippines should take to 
heart. Afterall, if the sick man can avoid pneumonia, so can you.  
Table 1: Real GDP Forecasts and Growth 
  
 
  IMF Forecast Private IMF Forecast Private Real GDP 
for 1998  
(May 1997) 
Consensus 
Forecast for 
1998 (June 
1997) 
Revision (May 
1997-May 
1998) 
Consensus 
Forecast 
Revision (June 
1997-June 
1998) 
Growth  
1998 
       
Indonesia 7.5 7.5 -12.5 -12.5 -13.1 
Korea 6.3 6.2 -7.1 -9.2 -5.8 
Malaysia 7.9 8.5 -5.4 -7.5 -6.7 
Thailand 7.0 6.5 -10.1 -11.0 -7.8 
The 
Philippines 6.4 6.1 -3.9 -4.0 -0.5 
 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Interim Assessment, December 1997;  
IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998;  
FT Currency Forecaster, June 1997, June 1998. 
 
Table 2: Banking System Exposure to Risk 
 
 
Short-term 
debt/Total debt 
Short-term 
debt/Reserves 
Ratio of 
corporate debt to 
equity, 1997 
 
   
Indonesia 24 160 2.3 
Korea 67 300 6.4 
Malaysia 39 55 2.2 
Thailand 46 107 4.1 
The Philippines 19 66 1.9 
 
Note: Data for the first column is as a percentage of GDP. Data for the last five columns  
are as a percentage of assets at the end of 1997. 
Sources: Data are from JP Morgan, Asia Financial Markets, January 1998 and Corsetti et al (1999, table 
19). 
  
  
Table 3: Central Business District Office Vacancy Rates and Rental Yields  
   Vacancy Rates Rental Yields 
   
  1997 (%) 1998-99 (%) June 1997 (%) 
Bangkok 15.0 20.0 6.80 
Jakarta 10.0 20.0 7.20 
Kuala Lumpur 3.0 20.0 8.80 
Manila 1.0 3.0 9.30 
 
Source: Corsetti et al. (1999), Table 9. 
 
Table 4: Change in Incremental Capital-Output Ratio, 1987-1996  
(percentage points) 
  
 
Indonesia -0.2 
Korea 1.1 
Malaysia 1.1 
Thailand 1.7 
The Philippines -0.5 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Various issues. 
  
Table 5: Financial Indicators 
 
 
Short-term 
debt/Total debt 
Short-term 
debt/Reserves 
Ratio of 
corporate debt to 
equity, 1997 
 
   
Indonesia 24 160 2.3 
Korea 67 300 6.4 
Malaysia 39 55 2.2 
Thailand 46 107 4.1 
The Philippines 19 66 1.9 
 
 
Table 6: Marginal Increase in Crisis Probability Due to  
Common External Lenders 
 
Indonesia 0.60 
Malaysia 0.35 
The Philippines 0.02 
 
Source: Goldstein et al. (2000), Table 6.3.  
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Notes 
See Noland et al. (1999) for a more detailed discussion of these theories and literature 
references. In some models the panicked investors would not necessarily be foreign 
investors—domestic capital flight could be another source of large rapid international 
capital movements. 
2. The principle, one could further try to separate "internal" and "external" sources of 
fundamental strength or weakness. However in practice they are typically interrelated: 
for example, real exchange rate overvaluation often leads to lending booms in domestic 
non-tradables such as real estate. For a useful synopsis of Philippine economic policy in 
the period immediately preceding the crisis, see Bautista and Lamberte (1996). See 
Barth and Dinmore (1999) on this point. 
3. For a useful synopsis of Philippine economic policy in the period immediately 
preceding the crisis, see Bautista and Lamberte (1996). 
4. See Barth and Dinmore (1999) on this point. 
5. Fritz-Krockrow (1999) argues that more general macroeconomic instability 
(particularly high and variable inflation) discouraged saving and hampered financial 
intermediation, especially the development of long-term financial instruments. 
6. In this regard, the prescient response by former finance minister Jesus P. Estanislao 
(1997) to a question posed at a 15 May 1997 lecture bears repeating: "In the case of 
Thailand, two critical sectors have been weakened because of over-capacity: real estate 
and banking. Real estate suffers from over-capacity: too many units have been built in 
relation to actual and potential demand. The financial sector, which was over-extended 
to the real estate sector, suffers from a high rate of past due loans in their overall loan 
portfolio. In the Philippines, the real estate sector is far from being overbuilt. The 
occupancy rate in prime commercial areas is very high, at more than 95%, and real 
estate as a sector accounts for less than 15% of the loan portfolio of the banking 
system. In fact, based on all the information available, both confidential and non-
confidential, the Philippines banking system is solid (p.28)." 
7. These restrictions were tightened immediately upon the commencement of the crisis 
in July 1997. At the same time the central bank imposed new liquidity requirements on 
foreign currency liabilities and removed tax disincentives on peso deposits. 
8. In this regard, the Philippines also benefitted from continued inflows of worker 
remittances. 
9. See, for example, Drazen (1997), Krugman (1997), and Calvo and Mendoza (2000). 
10. Again, it is worth quoting Estanislao's (1997) pre-crisis statement on this point: 
"Having been burned by the foreign debt problem of the 1980s, we in the Philippines are 
taking a very conservative stance toward foreign financing. We go for long-term bonds, 
and where possible also for equity finance from abroad. That is why we have been very 
active in the bond market as well as the equity market. We are so much less reliant on 
short-term commercial bank funding, from which we have been shying away" (p.35) 
11. Japanese banks reduced their exposure to the rest of Asia by an estimated $30 
billion in 1998, accounting for roughly 30 percent of the net capital outflow the region 
experienced in 1998. By 1999 nearly half of the Japanese banks which had been 
operating in Asia in mid-1997 had pulled out. 
12. At the time of the crisis, the Philippines was the only large Southeast Asian 
economy under an IMF program, which may have acted as a crude signal for foreign 
investors to proceed with caution, despite the notion that an agreement with the IMF is 
sometimes regarded as something akin to a macroeconomic "Good Housekeeping Seal 
of Approval." 
 
